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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
Amici are professors and scholars of Indian law listed in the 
APPENDIX. Amici submit this brief to assist the Court with the proper 
application of its precedent relevant to the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, treaties between the United States and Indian tribes, 
and the Court’s standards for interpreting those treaties.  
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
This Court consistently applies well-established principles of 
interpretation to treaties between the United States and Indian tribes. 
Those interpretive standards protect important aspects of both the United 
States’ constitutional structure and tribal identity. The decision below by 
the Wyoming District Court did not adhere to those time-honored rules of 
interpretation and is inconsistent with this Court’s precedent. Therefore, 
the Court must reverse that decision.  
Prior to 1868, Crow Tribal territory, at least as recognized by the 
United States in the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, encompassed nearly 40 
million acres, most of which was located in what became Montana and 
Wyoming. First Treaty of Fort Laramie, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749 
(reprinted in 2 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 594-
595 (1904)). In 1868, the Crow Tribe (“Tribe”) ceded more than three-
quarters of that land, over 30 million acres, to the United States via a 
subsequent treaty. Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 284 F.2d 361, 
362 (Ct. Cl. 1960). Importantly, however, in exchange for that cession and 
in order to protect access to game they needed to survive, the Tribe 
reserved the essential right to utilize traditional hunting, fishing, and 
gathering sites located outside their reservation. Specifically, the 1868 
Treaty reserved to the Tribe the “right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of 
the United States so long as game may be found thereon, and as long as 
peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting 
districts.” Treaty with the Crows, art. 4, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, 650.  
                                             
1.  No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part. No 
person or entity other than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Amici file this brief as 
individuals and not on behalf of the institutions with which they are affiliated.  Both 
Petitioner and Respondent consent to the filing of amicus briefs. 
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Treaties are the supreme law of the land, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, 
cl. 2, and they remain valid unless and until Congress clearly expresses its 
intent to abrogate them. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999) (“Mille Lacs”). (“Congress may 
abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent to do 
so.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 
314 U.S. 339, 346, 353-54 (1941) (Congress must be “plain and 
unambiguous” or “clear and plain” when abrogating tribal property 
rights.). Additional long-standing principles of treaty interpretation 
developed and applied by the Court require that treaties, along with any 
ambiguous language therein, be construed as the Indians would have 
understood them and be liberally interpreted in favor of the Indians. See, 
e.g., Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985); 
Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (declining “to 
construe the [Menominee] Termination Act as a backhanded way” to 
destroy the hunting and fishing rights, described by the Court as “property 
rights,” reserved by the Tribe in an earlier treaty).  
The Court’s long tradition of applying these interpretive standards 
ensures that government power is based on the consent of the governed 
and protects important structural aspects of federal Indian law and 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551-57 (1832) 
(interpreting the Treaty of Hopewell in view of congressional policy to 
“treat [tribes] as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose 
to afford that protection which treaties stipulate”). Following that tradition, 
which culminated most recently in the Court’s 1999 Mille Lacs decision, 
provides clear and straightforward answers to the questions presented in 
this case. 
Like other Indian nations, the Crow Tribe formally associated with 
the United States through treaties that cemented a consensual, 
intergovernmental relationship. The Treaty of 1868 memorialized certain 
terms of that agreement, including the Tribe’s right to continue to “hunt 
on the unoccupied lands of the United States.” Treaty with the Crows, art. 
4, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, 650. No subsequent treaties or statutes, 
including the Act admitting Wyoming to the Union, demonstrate any clear 
or unambiguous statement that Congress intended to terminate that right. 
Therefore, when properly applied, this Court’s standards for Indian treaty 
interpretation confirm the Crow Tribe’s ongoing right to hunt in the 
Bighorn National Forest in Wyoming. 
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The decisions of the Wyoming courts below ignored these 
judicially recognized legal principles and, instead, relied exclusively on 
the flawed reasoning of a 1995 United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit case, Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, and a 
United States Supreme Court case from 1896, Ward v. Race Horse, 163 
U.S. 504. This approach incorrectly rendered the Crow Treaty subject to 
different, uncertain, and less stringent interpretive rules than those applied 
by this Court to all other Indian treaties. Therefore, the Court should 




I. AS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND, INDIAN TREATIES 
ESTABLISH THE CENTRAL TENETS OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW.  
 
Treaties made by and between the United States and Indian tribes 
form the foundation of the unique federal-tribal relationship and have 
defined that relationship since this Court’s earliest decisions. These 
treaties are the supreme law of the land, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2, and 
remain enforceable unless Congress has clearly abrogated them by 
subsequent treaty or statute. See, e.g., Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202; United 
States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986). 
Through their treaty relationships with the United States, Indian 
tribes have been recognized as distinct nations since the beginning of the 
Republic. In one of its earliest Indian law decisions, for example, this 
Court recognized that “[t]he numerous treaties made with [Indian tribes] 
by the United States recognize them as a people . . .  responsible in their 
political character for any violation of their engagements.”. Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831). The Court continues to recognize 
Indian tribes based on that conception of their separate political character. 
See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 
U.S. 316, 327 (2008) (“For nearly two centuries now, we have recognized 
Indian tribes as ‘distinct, independent political communities.’” (quoting 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559)).  
Furthermore, although Indian nations are subject to federal authority, 
their exclusive treaty relationship with the United States generally 
insulates them from state authority in the absence of express federal 
legislation to the contrary. “The treaties and laws of the United States 
2019   HERRERA V. WYOMING            23 
contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the 
states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on 
exclusively by the government of the union.” Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557. 
Because the acts of the State of Georgia in Worcester “interfere[d] forcibly 
with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee 
nation” and were “in direct hostility with [those] treaties,” the Court 
determined the state laws could “have no force” within Cherokee territory. 
Id. at 561. It remains well established that treaties are a central component 
of the federal relationship with Indian tribes, and even outside of their 
territory, Indian tribes and their individual members exercising federally 
guaranteed treaty rights are generally free from regulation by the states. 
See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Tulee v. 
Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942). 
 
II. THE COURT DEVELOPED AND RELIES ON LONG-
STANDING PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION FOR 
ANALYZING INDIAN TREATIES.  
 
In light of the importance of treaties to the federal-tribal 
relationship, the Court fashioned specific rules of construction for 
interpreting treaties that give proper respect to the solemnity and purpose 
of those contracts. These rules, sometimes referred to as “canons of 
construction,” see, e.g., Cty. of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247; Antoine v. 
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975), honor both the elevated status of 
treaties under the Constitution and their meaning and intent. See, e.g., 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 551-57 (interpreting the Treaty of Hopewell in view 
of congressional policy to “treat [tribes] as nations, respect their rights, 
and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties 
stipulate”). These fundamental maxims of treaty interpretation are not 
simply an effort to address a perceived inequality in bargaining power 
between tribes and the United States. Instead, the rules are “rooted in the 
unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians[,]” Cty. 
of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247, and “have quasi-constitutional status . . . 
provid[ing] an interpretive methodology for protecting fundamental 
constitutive, structural values against all but explicit congressional 
derogation.” Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 2.02[2], at 118-
19 (Nell Jessup Newton, ed., 2012). 
The Court employs three basic interpretive principles when 
analyzing treaties between the United States and Indian tribes. First, the 
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Court “interpret[s] Indian treaties to give effect to the terms as the Indians 
themselves would have understood them.” Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196 
(citations omitted) (emphasizing the importance of the context of a treaty). 
This rule requires looking at treaty language “not according to the 
technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in 
which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.” Jones v. 
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); see also United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 
304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (Treaties “are not to be interpreted narrowly, as 
sometimes may be writings expressed in words of art employed by 
conveyancers, but are to be construed in the sense in which naturally the 
Indians would understand them.” (citations omitted)). 
Second, the Court liberally interprets the language of Indian 
treaties in favor of the Indians. As early as 1832, in Worcester, the Court 
instructed that, if the context of a treaty suggests its language can be 
extended beyond its “plain import,” then the language must be interpreted 
with that broader understanding. 31 U.S. at 582. Ambiguities in the treaty 
language are resolved in favor of the Indians. See, e.g., McClanahan v. 
Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973). The responsibility to 
interpret treaties in this manner seeks to ensure that treaty terms “are 
carried out, so far as possible . . . in a spirit which generously recognizes 
the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of [Indian] people.” 
Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684-85; see also Antoine, 420 U.S. at 199 (“The canon 
of construction applied over a century and a half by this Court is that the 
wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians is 
not to be construed to their prejudice.” (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. 515)); 
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (“Fishing Vessel”). Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
the Yakima Indian Nation, recognized that this principle is “deeply rooted 
in th[e] Court’s Indian jurisprudence” and “dictated” the Court’s 
interpretive choices in that case. 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992). 
Finally, the rights reserved by treaties remain intact unless 
Congress has expressed clear and unambiguous contrary intent. Mille 
Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202 (“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it 
must clearly express its intent to do so.” (citations omitted)); Cty. of 
Oneida, 470 U.S. at 257; Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690.  This rule avoids 
the inadvertent taking of tribal property rights—and the corresponding 
obligation to provide due compensation—by ensuring that federal actions 
should never be interpreted to abrogate reserved treaty rights by 
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implication. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 412-13, 
417.  
The state court decisions in this case ignored this Court’s 
interpretive rules and, instead, determined that the mere admission of 
Wyoming as a state impliedly abrogated hunting rights promised to the 
Crow Tribe by the federal government in the 1868 Treaty. See Pet.App.32, 
34. 
 
III. THE COURT’S LONG-STANDING PRINCIPLES OF INDIAN 
TREATY INTERPRETATION DEMONSTRATE WHY THE DECISION 
BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED.  
 
A.  These Principles Apply to All Indian Treaties. 
 
The Court developed specific standards for interpreting Indian 
treaties in order to protect the quasi-constitutional status of treaties and 
preserve the benefit of the bargains that those documents memorialize. 
Failing to apply those rules when engaging in treaty interpretation 
endangers the very foundations of this Court’s Indian law and 
constitutional jurisprudence. The Court developed those interpretive rules 
because of the importance of Indian treaties to the creation of our nation 
and in recognition that the United States’ promises should be honored, 
whether pledged two centuries or two minutes ago. Cf. Federal Power 
Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.”).  
Thus, failing to adhere to these principles is an affront to the dignity of 
those solemn guarantees.  
Treaty promises continue to define the contours of this Court’s 
more modern Indian law jurisprudence, see, e.g., Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 
196-203, and form the basis of the ongoing government-to-government 
relationship among tribes, states, and the United States. Allowing 
alternative interpretive approaches by state courts would render both the 
United States and signatory tribes subject to inconsistent and potentially 
arbitrary judicial review of their agreements. While the different language, 
meaning, and intent of each treaty demand specific attention, the rules by 
which courts must attend to that analysis are well-established. Allowing 
deviation from those standards, given the long history of this Court’s 
stalwart commitment to them, would not only demean the hundreds of 
treaties between the United States and Indian tribes, it would plunge into 
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uncertainty the meaning and scope of the relationships established by 
those treaties.  
 
B.  The Court Has Applied These Interpretive Principles to 
Permit Indians to Exercise Reserved Treaty Rights to Hunt and Fish Off-
Reservation Notwithstanding State Regulation. 
 
The exercise by an individual Indian of a treaty-reserved right to 
hunt or fish off-reservation can lead to conflict with local and state laws. 
With the exception of Race Horse, the Court has consistently resolved 
these conflicts by applying the well-established standards for interpreting 
Indian treaties to insulate the exercise of tribal treaty rights from state 
regulation except in narrow and specific circumstances. 
The Court’s approach to enforcing tribes’ off-reservation treaty 
rights began with Winans in 1905. 198 U.S. 371. In that case, non-Indians 
had effectively blocked tribal members from accessing their traditional 
fishing grounds by constructing a fish wheel on the non-Indians’ private 
property. Id. at 377. The Court interpreted treaty language to require tribes’ 
access to their traditional sites even though the non-Indians had complied 
with state law. Id. at 381-82, 384. The Court recognized that the right to 
use traditional fishing locations was “part of larger rights possessed by the 
Indians,” and that the “form of the [treaty] and its language was adapted” 
to preserve the exercise of those rights. Id. at 381. The Court expressly 
rejected the argument that the Tribe’s reserved rights were abrogated by 
admission of the State of Washington to the Union. Id. at 382-84. 
Similarly, in Tulee, the Court considered Washington’s conviction 
of a member of the Yakima Tribe for failure to obtain a state license to fish. 
315 U.S. at 682.  “Viewing the treaty in . . . light” of the rule requiring 
liberal construction and an understanding of the language as the Indians 
would have understood it, the Court determined that the “state is without 
power to charge the Yakimas a fee for fishing” because the State’s 
licensing requirement could not “be reconciled with a fair construction of 
the treaty.” Id. at 685.2  
                                             
2. In a series of cases following Winans and Tulee, the Court defined 
the balance between off-reservation treaty rights and state authority by allowing that 
states may regulate off-reservation exercise of treaty rights only as necessary for the 
conservation of a species, and only if the state’s regulation does not discriminate 
against Indians. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968) 
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The Court most recently and extensively pronounced its 
interpretive standards for Indian treaties in 1999 in Mille Lacs. 526 U.S. 
at 196-203. There, the majority interpreted treaty language to recognize 
that the usufructuary rights reserved by the treaty were more than mere 
“privileges” that would “justify [a] difference[ ] in [allowing] state 
regulatory authority.” Id. at 205-06. As described in greater detail infra, 
Mille Lacs does not support the decision below.   
These principles of construction are fundamental to this Court’s 
Indian law jurisprudence and necessary for ensuring that treaties and the 
rights preserved by them are given due consideration and protection as 
usufructuary rights reserved under federal law. 
 
C. The Court’s Interpretive Rules Require Preservation of 
Tribal Treaty Rights to Ensure That Constitutional Power Is Based on the 
Consent of the Governed. 
 
Congress has broad authority to legislate in the domain of Indian 
affairs; however, the exercise of federal power over Indian nations is 
problematic because Indian nations were not parties to the Constitution. 
Indian nations like the Crow Tribe negotiated agreements with the United 
States. Those treaties have a quasi-constitutional status, both because they 
are the supreme law of the land and because they provide a source of 
federal power that is potentially based on mutual consent. 
Treaties provided a mechanism for Indian tribes to retain the 
lands, waters, and hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on which their 
ways of life would continue to depend. At the time the treaties were 
entered, these rights were “not much less necessary to the existence of the 
Indians than the atmosphere they breathed,” Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, and 
they have remained so to the present day. As Judge Boldt noted in his 
landmark 1974 decision regarding tribal fishing rights in the State of 
                                             
(Puyallup I); Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Antoine, 
420 U.S. 194; Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977); 
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675-76. In each of these cases, the Court analyzed the 
relevant treaty or other agreement in accordance with established interpretive 
principles. E.g., Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 397-98 (“It is in th[e] spirit [of liberal treaty 
construction] that we approach these cases.”); Antoine, 420 U.S. at 199-200; Fishing 
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675-76. The decision below did not take up the “conservation 
necessity issue” and it is not before the Court in this case. Pet.App.25 n.7; Pet.App.14 
n.3. 
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Washington, treaty rights protect “the means of economic livelihood and 
the foundation of native culture,” and “[r]eservation of the right to gather 
food in this fashion protected the Indians' right to maintain essential 
elements of their way of life, as a complement to the life defined by the 
permanent homes, allotted farm lands, compulsory education, technical 
assistance and pecuniary rewards offered in the treaties.” United States v. 
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 406-07 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d 520 U.S. 
676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). Off-reservation 
usufructuary rights remain essential to the very identity of the tribes and 
tribal people who exercise them today. See, e.g., Columbia River 
Intertribal Fish Comm’n, We Are All Salmon People, 
http://www.critfc.org/salmon-culture/we-are-all-salmon-people/ (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2017); Allison M. Dussias, Spirit Food and Sovereignty: 
Pathways for Protecting Indigenous Peoples' Subsistence Rights, 58 Clev. 
St. L. Rev. 273, 276 (2010) (Subsistence resources “are not just food for 
the body, but also ‘spirit food.’”).  
Thus, the Court’s approach to treaty interpretation ensures the 
fulfillment of the historic bargains through which the United States 
acquired much of its territory. The treaties marked the terms of that 
exchange. The United States obtained land and an end to hostilities and 
pledged in return to respect remaining tribal homelands, tribal political 
existence, and the ability for tribes to sustain themselves. The terms of 
those treaties “seemed to promise more, and give the word of the nation 
for more” to Indian tribes than that guaranteed to other citizens. Winans, 
198 U.S. at 380. In order to ensure those promises are kept, the Court’s 
interpretive standards recognize that a “treaty was not a grant of rights to 
the Indians, but a grant of right from them,—a reservation of those not 
granted.” Id. at 381. 
 
IV. THE DECISION OF THE WYOMING DISTRICT COURT IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S INTERPRETIVE 
TRADITION. 
 
The Wyoming District Court failed to apply the Court’s long-
standing interpretive rules of construction. Instead, it simply endorsed the 
trial court’s “adopt[ion of] the analysis and conclusions” of Repsis, which 
largely tracked the Supreme Court’s 1896 decision in Race Horse. 
Pet.App.34. In addition, the District Court, like the trial court before it, 
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misinterpreted Mille Lacs to support its decision. Id. The decision below 
is contrary to this Court’s jurisprudence. 
 
A. Race Horse and Repsis Depart From This Court’s Indian 
Treaty Precedent. 
 
Both Race Horse and Repsis interpreted Indian treaties to resolve 
ambiguities against the tribes involved. First, the Race Horse Court took 
pains to interpret the relationship between the phrases “unoccupied lands 
of the United States” and “so long as peace subsists among the whites and 
Indians on the borders of the hunting districts” in the Eastern Shoshone 
and Bannock Treaty. 163 U.S. at 507-14. While initially conceding that the 
former phrase alone would protect hunting rights across all federal lands, 
the Court then determined that the meaning of that phrase must be 
controlled by the subsequent phrase, specifically the words “hunting 
districts.” Id. at 507-08. Although the Court did not define the term 
“hunting districts,” it interpreted that phrase to mean that the treaty rights 
at issue were contingent upon the continuing existence of the “hunting 
districts” and, therefore, were of a “temporary and precarious nature.” Id. 
at 509-10 (The treaty no longer “authorized the continued enjoyment of 
the right of killing game . . . when the territory ceased to be a part of the 
hunting districts, and came within the authority and jurisdiction of a 
state.”).  
While the parties to the treaty may have understood that the treaty 
language conditioned the tribal hunting rights on certain circumstances—
“unoccupied land,” the presence of game, peace—the Race Horse Court 
combined those terms to concoct its own understanding of the treaty, 
which denigrated those rights without regard for the parties’ intent or the 
tribal interests at stake. The Court then relied on that construction to find 
that Wyoming’s subsequent statehood, an event occurring much later, 
unmentioned in the treaty, and not considered during its negotiation, ended 
the tribal rights. By interpreting the treaty to secure only “temporary and 
precarious” rights, the Race Horse Court simply “declined to follow” the 
applicable interpretive rules in favor of its own approach. Race Horse, 163 
U.S. at 516; Repsis, 73 F.3d at 992.  
Ignoring the absence of any express language in Wyoming’s 
statehood act regarding treaty rights, the Repsis court applied to the Crow 
Treaty Race Horse’s “abrogation-by-implication” approach. Id. (“The 
Tribe's right to hunt reserved in the Treaty with the Crows, 1868, was 
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repealed by the act admitting Wyoming into the Union.” (citing Race 
Horse, 163 U.S. at 514)). Repsis further followed the lead of Race Horse 
to fashion its own interpretive construction of the Crow Treaty. After 
deferring entirely to Race Horse’s “temporary and precarious” 
construction, the Repsis court then struck out on its own to find an 
“alternative basis” for its holding. Id. at 993. Interpreting the treaty term 
“unoccupied,” the court determined that creation of the “Big Horn 
National Forest” limited certain activities on those lands, thereby 
rendering them occupied and ending the Crow’s treaty rights. Id. (“These 
lands were no longer available for settlement. No longer could anyone 
timber, mine, log, graze cattle, or homestead on these lands without federal 
permission.” (citing Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 35-36)).3 The 
Repsis court neither considered what the parties to the treaty intended by 
“unoccupied” nor engaged in any treaty interpretation on that question.4  
 
B. Mille Lacs, Not Race Horse or Repsis, Guides Resolution 
of the Questions Presented Here. 
 
Applying the interpretive guidance set forth in Mille Lacs to the 
treaty language at issue in this case demonstrates the inconsistency of Race 
Horse, Repsis, and the decisions below with the great weight of this 
Court’s jurisprudence interpreting Indian treaties. Applying that guidance 
to the Crow Treaty confirms the ongoing existence of the hunting rights 
reserved therein. 
First, Mille Lacs reiterated the need to understand treaty language 
as the tribal party to that treaty would have understood it. 526 U.S. at 196. 
No court yet has analyzed what the members of the Crow Tribe would 
have understood the treaty to mean with regard to their “right to hunt on 
the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found 
thereon, and as long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the 
                                             
3.  While now named the Bighorn National Forest, the area was 
originally called the Big Horn Forest Reserve. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 
393, 29 Stat. 909 (Feb.  22, 1897).  
4.  Repsis also overlooked interpretations of that term and similar 
treaty language by other courts, most of which reached exactly the opposite conclusion 
about its meaning. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 
1278 (9th Cir. 1994); State v. Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386 (Idaho 1972); State v. Stasso, 563 
P.2d 562, 565 (Mont. 1977); State v. Arthur, 261 P.2d 135, 143 (Idaho 1953). 
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borders of the hunting districts.” Treaty with the Crows, art. 4, May 7, 
1868, 15 Stat. 649, 650.  
Second, Mille Lacs flatly rejected the notion that the admission of 
a state to the United States would, standing alone, mark an end to treaty-
reserved rights within that state. 526 U.S. at 205 (“[S]tatehood by itself is 
insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on 
land within state boundaries.”). Congress apparently understood the same, 
as legislation enacted subsequent to Wyoming’s statehood expressly 
recognized the continuing existence of rights reserved in the Crow Treaty 
of 1868. See, e.g., An Act: Making appropriations for the current and 
contingent expenses of the Indian Department, ch. 543,§ 31, 26 Stat. 989, 
1042, (1891) (ratifying an agreement with the Crow Indians regarding sale 
of lands and construction of school houses and other facilities with the 
proviso that “all existing provisions of the treaty of May seventh Anno 
Domini eighteen hundred and sixty-eight . . . shall continue in force”); An 
Act to ratify and amend an agreement with the Indians of the Crow 
Reservation in Montana, and making appropriations to carry the same into 
effect, Pub. L. No. 58-183, Art. VII, 33 Stat. 352, 355 (1904) (“The 
existing provisions of all former treaties with the Crow tribe of Indians not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement, are hereby continued in 
force and effect, and all provisions thereof inconsistent herewith 
[pertaining to sale of a portion of the reservation] are hereby repealed.”). 
Nonetheless, according to Race Horse and Repsis, Wyoming’s admission 
to the Union created an “irreconcilable conflict” with the treaty rights 
reserved by the Crow. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514; Repsis, 73 F.3d at 990.  
Third, according to Mille Lacs, “Congress may abrogate Indian 
treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent to do so.” 526 U.S. at 
202 (citations omitted). Although construing the Eastern Shoshone and 
Bannock Treaty, not the Crow Treaty, the Race Horse majority found no 
express language in that treaty or in Wyoming’s statehood act that signaled 
the end of those treaty rights. See 163 U.S. at 511, 514 (Although “repeals 
by implication are not favored . . . repeal [of the treaty-reserved rights] 
result[ed] from the conflict between the treaty and the act admitting 
[Wyoming] into the Union,” despite the silence of that act as to treaty 
rights.). Repsis then adopted this misguided approach when interpreting 
the Crow Treaty. Repsis, 73 F.3d at 990. 
Finally, Mille Lacs reiterated the Court’s prior instructions that 
“Indian treaties are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the Indians . . . 
and that any ambiguities are to be resolved in their favor.” 526 U.S. at 200 
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(citations omitted). The Court followed that rule when interpreting 
language in an 1855 treaty pursuant to which the Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa had agreed to “fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the 
United States, any and all right, title and interest . . . in, and to any other 
lands.” Id. at 195 (quoting Treaty with the Chippewa, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 
Stat. 1165). Noting that the language said nothing about the Chippewa’s 
1837 treaty; the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in territories across 
Minnesota they reserved in that treaty; or the abrogation of those rights, 
the Court concluded that even if such silence amounted to a “plausible 
ambiguity,” the Court’s interpretive standards required ruling in favor of 
the Chippewa. Id. at 200. 
Rather than follow Mille Lacs’ deliberate and thorough approach 
to treaty interpretation, the Wyoming circuit court instead relied solely and 
erroneously on Repsis, concluding that the Crow “hunting rights were 
temporary and ended upon the occupation of the [Bighorn National 
Forest].” Pet.App.41. Then, rather than correct that misguided approach 
and adhere to Mille Lacs, the Wyoming District Court instead determined 
that Mille Lacs only “reaffirmed the principle that the court must look at 
the language in the treaty to determine whether it was intended to be 
perpetual or if it was intended to terminate at the occurrence of a ‘clearly 
contemplated’ event.” Pet.App.34. Neither of these approaches is viable in 
light of Mille Lacs and the Court’s long-standing interpretive principles 
repeated in that decision. 
 
C. Mille Lacs Repudiated Race Horse and Repsis. 
 
By myopically relying on Race Horse and Repsis, the decisions 
below ignored this Court’s evisceration of the legal theories undergirding 
those decisions. The majority opinion in Mille Lacs repeatedly criticized 
the reasoning of Race Horse, saying that the decision “has been qualified 
by later decisions of th[e] Court,” 526 U.S. at 203, that it “rested on a false 
premise,” id. at 204, and that it “[wa]s simply too broad to be useful as a 
guide to whether treaty rights were intended to survive statehood.” Id. at 
206. Even the core of Race Horse’s central inquiry, i.e., “whether 
Congress . . . intended the rights secured by the [relevant treaty] to survive 
statehood,” 526 U.S. at 207, was mistaken:  
 
Race Horse rested on a false premise.  As this 
Court's subsequent cases have made clear, an Indian 
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tribe's treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather are not 
irreconcilable with a State's sovereignty over natural 
resources in the State.  . . . [Race Horse] was informed by 
that Court's conclusion that the Indian treaty rights were 
inconsistent with state sovereignty over natural resources 
. . .  .But . . . Indian treaty-based usufructuary rights are 
not inconsistent with state sovereignty over natural 
resources.  
 
Id. at 204, 207-08. 
In light of the majority’s obvious disagreement with Race Horse, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, concluded that the Mille Lacs majority 
had “effectively overrule[d]” Race Horse. Id. at 219. Thus, contrary to the 
overly narrow and inapt reading of Race Horse by the Wyoming District 
Court, see Pet.App.24, Mille Lacs implicitly overruled Race Horse and, 
by extension, Repsis. See also State v. Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386, 1392 n.6 
(Idaho 1972) (In a decision pre-dating Mille Lacs by a quarter century, the 
Idaho Supreme Court read this Court’s precedent to see that “Race Horse 
and the theory it posited ha[d] been entirely discredited.”). 
By relying on Repsis and Race Horse, the decision below failed 
to follow this Court’s directions for interpreting the Crow Treaty. This 
Court must correct those errors by applying its well-established rules for 




This Court has faithfully and repeatedly protected the tribal rights 
reserved in treaties with the United States from unjustified abrogation and 
improper subjugation to state authority. Such protection is mandated by 
the supremacy of federal treaties under the Constitution and the need to 
ensure justice for the tribal parties to those agreements. See, e.g., Winans, 
198 U.S. at 380-81 (interpreting the treaty at issue so as to “counterpoise 
the inequality” of treaty negotiations and observing that the “negotiations 
and a convention . . . seemed to promise more, and give the word of the 
nation for more” than the mere “rights . . . that any inhabitant of the 
territory or state would have”).  
The decisions of the Wyoming courts in this matter diverged from 
that tradition in favor of following the faded hoof prints of Race Horse and 
Repsis. Those decisions below ignored the fact that Mille Lacs fatally 
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undercut both Race Horse and Repsis. This case presents an opportunity 
for this Court to reaffirm the well-founded interpretive principles it 
developed for Indian treaties. Doing so is necessary to honor the “deeply 
rooted” role of those principles in the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence 
and avoid the uncertainty and confusion that would result from endorsing 
alternative approaches to treaty interpretation by state and lower federal 
courts. Cty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 269. 
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